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Abstract 
We use data from a nationally representative survey of Italian graduates to study whether 
Alma Mater matters for employment and earnings three years after graduation. We find that 
the attended college matters, and that there are important college related differences, both 
among and within regions of the country. These differences, however, do not persist over 
time and are not large enough to trigger substantial mobility flows from poorly performing to 
better performing institutions. We also find evidence that going to a private university pays 
off at least in the early part of a career. Only part of this gain can be explained by the fact that 
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1. Introduction 
Does the attended college affect the earnings and employment prospects of graduates? 
This question is particularly important for those households sending their offspring to college 
and paying part of the cost, and for the government, which often runs universities and needs 
to know whether and why some institutions are delivering better outcomes than others.  
  Spurred by the interest on the quality of education, a recent literature has investigated 
the labour market effects of college quality, mainly but not exclusively in the US. Black and 
Smith (2004) and Brand and Halaby (2003) review the key contributions. The main focus in 
this literature has been on comparing elite versus non – elite colleges, and the degree of 
selectivity has been measured either with the average SAT score of the incoming freshmen – 
in the US – or with the average A-level score of the intake of students – in the UK (see 
Chevalier and Conlon, 2003). The basic finding of this literature is that college quality 
matters for labour market outcomes.  
In this paper we investigate the Italian case and study the effect of the attended 
university on earnings and employment prospects three years after graduation. The Italian 
case is interesting. Compared to the experience of other developed countries, the system of 
Italian universities has resisted differentiation – in terms of recognized prestige or 
curriculum
1. While selective admission criteria are not forbidden, they are not the standard 
practice of most public universities, which charge relatively low tuition fees to admitted 
students
2. Given this institutional framework, the natural expectation is that the college an 
individual has graduated from – her Alma Mater – should matter little for labour market 
performance.  
                                                 
1 Arum et al. (2004) classify university systems into unitary, binary and stratified, and allocate the Italian system 
to the small club of unitary systems. 
2 With few exceptions, access to Italian universities during the period covered by this study required only a 
leaving high school certificate. Since the liberalization of access in 1969, almost all high school graduates can 
be admitted to the faculty of choice. See www.eurydice.org for further details.    3
Since we cannot measure unambiguously selectivity, we assess heterogeneity in the 
returns to college by focusing on college fixed effects, the public/private divide and on 
observable measures of college quality. We find that Alma Mater matters for the early labour 
market performance of Italian graduates, and that graduates of most universities located in the 
more developed Northern part of the country experience three years after graduation 
significantly higher employment weighted earnings than graduates from Southern 
universities.  
In the absence of constraints to college choice, these significant inter-regional 
differences should be arbitraged away by the mobility of students from the South to the 
North. However, we find that such mobility is limited. One possible reason is liquidity 
constraints, but we find little evidence of their presence. Alternative explanations include:  
regional cost differentials, which reduce the rate of return gap between the North and the 
South; the possibility that the uncovered differences in returns are temporary, and therefore 
not sufficient to compensate the long run costs of studying in another area of the country. 
We also find that graduating from a private university yields a 18 percent  premium in 
terms of employment weighted earnings with respect to graduating from a public college. 
Measures of college quality and size go some but not all the way in explaining the private 
college premium. We speculate that additional factors are at play, especially for privileged 
individuals: private schools provide valuable network effects, and the value of these networks 
is higher for individuals with a good family background, because of the complementarity 
between family and school networks.  
Our results have a number of interesting policy implications. First, we find that a 10 
percent decrease in the pupil / teacher ratio should increase employment weighted college 
earnings by 2.4 percent. Therefore, reducing crowded classrooms is likely to improve the 
quality of graduates and increase private and social payoffs. Whether this increase is   4
sufficient to compensate the costs of having a higher number of faculties remains an open 
question
3. Second, many commentators
4 have argued that student mobility is an essential part 
of the much needed reform of the Italian higher education system. Our findings suggest that 
the actual dispersion of employment weighted earnings by college of graduation is not 
sufficient to trigger relevant inter-regional mobility flows, and that a more pronounced 
differentiation of colleges in terms of quality may be an important ingredient to attain higher 
student mobility 
 
2. The Data 
The National Statistical Office (ISTAT) carries out on a regular basis a survey –  the 
“Indagine statistica sull’inserimento professionale dei laureati” - on the transition from 
college to work of a representative sample of Italian graduates. In the last available wave 
individuals who graduated from Italian universities in 1998 are interviewed three years after 
completion of the degree, in 2001.
5 The interviewed sample corresponds to 16 percent of the 
population of graduates of 1998. The survey covers school curriculum, labour market 
experience in the three years after graduation, job search activities, household and individual 
information. We match these data to information on college quality disaggregated by faculty 
and provided by ISTAT for the academic year 1996-7
6.   
The focus of our analysis is on the effects of the university the individual graduated 
from – her Alma Mater - on the probability of being employed three years after graduation 
and on her net monthly earnings in the job held at the time of the interview. Employment in 
                                                 
3 Italian universities are organized into faculties, and each faculty offers degrees in a well defined field of study. 
For instance, the Faculty of Economics offers degrees in the field of Economics. 
4 See for instance Perotti (2004). 
5 The survey does not include Italian graduates from foreign universities, who, according to Survey on 
Households Income and Wealth by the Bank of Italy, covered in 2002 only 2 percent of all graduates. We 
acknowledge that this exclusion could induce a sample selection issue; however, since these cases represent a  
relatively small proportion of the population, we believe that our estimates should not be affected too much. 
6 ISTAT, Lo stato dell’università, several issues. Since the publicly available micro-data do not include 
information on the university the interviewed individual graduated from, we carried out the matching at the 
ADELE ISTAT laboratory in Rome, where such information can be obtained.   5
the survey refers to all paid jobs, including training contracts
7. About 4 percent of the 
currently employed are on a training contract – which includes post-graduate students funded 
by bursaries. Since the earnings in a training contract are likely to be rather far from normal 
earnings even for labour market entrants, we exclude individuals on a training scheme from 
our estimating sample.
8  
Monthly earnings in 2001 are in euros and net of taxes and social security 
contributions
9. Average earnings in the sample are 1142 euros per month, with a standard 
deviation of 414.9, and range from a minimum of 103,2 € to a maximum of 4131,6 €. On the 
other hand, the average probability of being employed three years after graduation is 0.758, 
so that more than 7 graduates out of 10 are employed at the time of the survey.  
On average, male graduates earn about 25 percent more than females, and are more 
likely to have a paid job three years after graduation. Having graduated from a private college 
yields a wage premium close to 10 percent, and a premium in the probability of employment 
around 15 percent. Finally, graduation from a college located in the Northwest yields a 20 
percent wage premium and an almost 50 percent employment premium with respect to 
having graduated in a Southern college. The regional wage premium falls considerably from 
20 to 8.3 if we compare individuals who graduated from a college in the Northwest and work 
in the same area with individuals who graduated in the South but work in the Northwest.  
Average earnings are highest for graduates in Medicine, who face on the other hand 
the lowest employment probability, and lowest for graduates in Foreign Languages. There is 
                                                 
7 The relevant question is: “Are you now – at the time of the survey – on a paid job? “ Only a very small 
minority of those not currently employed were employed in the week before the interview. Since we do not have 
information on wages, we drop these individuals from the sample. 
8 Postgraduate students are about ten percent of the original sample, of which roughly half report receiving some 
forms of payment. Paid postgraduates are students in PhD programs and medical schools; while being a 
potential source of selectivity issue, their exclusion from the sample may not be particularly relevant in practice, 
given the small number. We have checked how the proportion of excluded postgraduate students varies by field 
across universities, and found their incidence to be remarkably similar  across institutions located in different 
areas of the country.  
9 Earnings in the publicly available data are provided in brackets rather than as a continuous variable. All our 
computations based on continuous variables were carried out at the ADELE ISTAT laboratory in Rome.   6
also considerable dispersion in earnings and employment probabilities both within and 
between fields of study. 
 
3. The Empirical Strategy    
Our analysis consists of two steps. In the first step, we extract college-faculty effects 
from regressions involving individual earnings and employment probabilities. In the second 
step, we study the empirical relationship between the uncovered effects and cluster-level 
measures of educational inputs derived from official statistics, including the type of college – 
public versus private. By resorting to such a procedure we make it explicit that it is the cluster 
- level variability that provides identification of the effect of educational inputs: the same 
parameter would not be identified from individual level data, conditional on cluster effects. 
Specifically, let the individual-level outcome of interest, yi, be a function of the 
attended college-faculty cluster (denoted by the dummy d
cf
i) and of observable attributes (xi), 





cf+xi’γ+ui  (i=1…N), (1) 
 
In our case, yi is either the log of net monthly earnings or the individual employment status; 
for the former we use a linear regression, whereas for the latter we assume normality of the 
error term and use a probit regression.
10 The vector of observables includes gender, region of 
employment (region of birth for the employment equation), labour market experience and 
type of job (only for the wage equation), parental background in terms of occupation and 
education, year of birth, the number of siblings, the duration of college studies, the final 
                                                 
10 We experimented analysing earnings and employment simultaneously by means of a model with endogenous 
selection into employment, but did not find the correlation between the errors of the employment and wage 
equation to be statistically significant at usual levels of confidence.   7
graduation mark, the type of high school attended (whether generalist or 
technical/professional) and the marks reported in the high school graduation exam. We also 
include interactions between parental education and occupation, on the one hand, and marks 
and school types, on the other.  
In estimating equation (1) we make the assumption that, conditional on the 
observables, there is no selection into college-faculty clusters according to students 
unobserved ability, so that the coefficients can be consistently estimated. Clearly, the validity 
of such an assumption depends on how well we control for factors that are related to 
individual ability and that may influence college choice. While there is no guarantee that our 
assumption is going to be met, we stress  that the vector of observables consists of a detailed 
list of control factors, including interactions, which leads us to believe that omitted variables 
bias – if existent – is  mild.  
As discussed by Black and Smith (2004) in the context of the college quality 
literature, both regression methods and matching techniques are based on the ‘selection on 
observables’ assumption. One advantage of matching over linear regression is that it makes a 
non-parametric use of information on control factors, thereby avoiding any additional omitted 
variable bias stemming from functional form misspecification in linear models. However, 
since we allow many of the observables to enter equation (1) rather flexibly (i.e. either 
linearly and through interaction terms) we can expect functional form misspecification to be 
relatively unimportant in our case. 
  The inclusion of regional dummies in equation (1) captures local labour and product 
market effects. The identification of the college by faculty effects is ensured by the presence 
of more than one college per region, and by the inter-regional mobility of students. By using 
regional rather than provincial dummies we implicitly assume that local labour market 
conditions do not vary significantly within each region. This is reasonable in the Italian   8
context, where the key divide for labour market heterogeneity is the North versus the South
11. 
Since one college per province is the general rule in Italy, this assumption is necessary for 
identification: the inclusion of provincial rather than regional dummies would capture in most 
of the cases the college effects we are interested in.  
Regression (1) is the first step in our procedure and allows us to predict log-monthly 
earnings and employment probability by college/faculty clusters. In the second step we 
analyze the determinants of college-faculty wage and employment effects. Let qcf be the 
estimate of θ
cf from the earnings or employment equation
12. The second step equation is:  
 




fc+β’zcf+εcf  (2) 
 
where f 
j, j=1…F, is a set of faculty dummies, c
k, k=1…C is a set of college dummies, and z 
is a vector of variables measuring educational inputs. The coefficients associated to the 
dummy variables in (2) capture the effects of each college or faculty on average earnings or 
employment. The second step estimates are based on Weighted Least Squares, with weights 
proportional to the (inverse) of the variance of  q
cf - estimated from (1), in order to account 
for the fact that the dependent variable is a  generated variable from the first stage estimate. 
We get around to the fact that employment effects are bounded in the (0,1) interval by using a 
Box-Cox transformation. 
  Human capital theory suggests that educational choice is driven by expected returns. 
Therefore, an interesting measure of labour market performance three years after graduation 
is the employment weighted wage effect. Let ecf be the average employment probability and 
wcf be the average earnings in a given college-faculty cluster: expected earnings in the cluster 
                                                 
11 For instance, most of the variation in local unemployment rates is between the Northern and the Southern 
regions, rather than within each area. See Brunello et al. (2001). 
12 In the case of employment, we transform the estimated coefficients associated with college-faculty cluster 
dummies into probabilities by using the standard normal cumulative distribution function and by evaluating all 
the other regressors at their sample means.   9
are therefore ewcf=ecfwcf which can be expressed in logs as log(ecf) + log(wcf), a quantity that 
we can compute (together with its variance) from our first stage regression, and use as an 
additional outcome in the second stage WLS regression. This variable will play a prominent 
role in the discussion below. 
 
4. Results  
  As mentioned in the previous section, the identification of college by faculty effects 
relies both on the fact that most regions have several universities
13 and on the presence of 
movers, who study in a region and work in another region. Table 1 illustrates the mobility 
flows across four macro areas, North-West, North-East, Centre and South, which group the 
20 regions of the country. Needless to say, flows between areas are lower than flows between 
regions, because aggregation cancels out the flows within a single area. As expected, 
individuals completing a degree in the Centre or in the South are more likely than individuals 
in the North to relocate and work in another macro-area, typically the North West, where 
many college jobs are located. Overall, the percentage of individuals who currently work in a 
region after graduating in another region is close to one quarter of the population of 
graduates.
14 
<Table 1 around here> 
 
4.1 College effects on wages and employment 
We interpret the estimated coefficients of the 362 dummies as the impacts of college and 
faculty on individual earnings and employment three years after graduation. Under the 
                                                 
13 Lombardia, the largest region, has 11 universities. 
14 It is worth noting that the North-East is a net exporter of college graduates towards the North-West, at least in 
relative terms. Part of this finding may reflect return migration: while almost 8 percent of natives from the 
North-West go to college in the North-East, the figures halve when considering the opposite flow. Still, the 
finding can be seen as a symptom of the different productive structure in the two areas, dominated by small 
manufacturing firms in the North-East, and by large enterprises in manufacturing and banking in the North-
West, leading to a different structure of the demand for skills.   10
assumption that individual ability has been adequately captured by our first step controls, 
these estimates are consistent
15.  
We disentangle the contributions of the faculty and the university to wage and 
employment by regressing the estimated effects on faculty and college dummies – see 
equation (2) above. In order to have sufficient observations for each university, we restrict 
our attention to institutions with at least three faculties. The college dummies in these second 
step regressions measure the impact of each university on earnings and employment 
probabilities, conditional on the field of study and on the individual effects controlled in the 
first stage
16. The employment weighted college wage effects in the second step regression are 
significantly higher for the graduates of  many colleges located in the North of the country 
than for the graduates of most Southern colleges, and the difference between the highest and 
the lowest college effect is close to 130 percent. There are important exceptions, however, 
with some of the southern universities producing  higher returns in terms of expected 
earnings than colleges in the North. Sharp differences occur not only between universities 
located in distant regions, but also within regions.  
One might object that the uncovered inter-regional differences reflect local labour 
market rather than college differences. In the first stage, however, we have explicitly 
controlled for local labour market effects by adding to the regressions regional dummies for 
the region where the job is located. To assess the robustness of our findings, we have re-
estimated first stage regressions by omitting regional labour market dummies. We find that 
inter-regional gaps widen considerably, and that the highest employment weighted college 
wage effects are registered now in Lombardy and in part of the North-East, the areas of the 
country with very active local labour markets. 
                                                 
15 These are net impacts because the college and faculty can affect some of the controls, such as labour market 
experience, performance in college, type of job, region where the job is located and actual time to complete the 
degree.  
16 For reasons of space results of the second step regressions are not reported here and are available in  Brunello 
and Cappellari (2005).   11
If students were perfectly mobile across universities, and the private costs of 
graduating from each institution were homogeneous across the country, we would expect 
these large differences in college–specific labour market returns to be washed away by 
arbitrage activities. Mobility of university students, however, is limited. The data provide 
information both on the region of residence before going to college and on the region where 
the college is located, thereby allowing observation of mobility flows. 
 
<Table 2 around here> 
 
As shown in Table 2, there is limited mobility across macro-regions, not only in the 
Northern and Central areas, where many better performing universities are located, but also 
in the South, where universities are among the worst performing in the sample. More in 
detail, students who resided in the South before college either remain there for college 
(73.5%) or move to the nearby Centre (18.8%): less than 8% move to the North.  
  How do we explain the observed limited mobility flows between macro-areas in the 
presence of substantial differences in employment weighted college wage effects? Since most 
universities do not restrict admissions by applying numerus clausus
17, the explanation must 
rely on the demand for college education. One natural possibility is that Southern students are 
restrained from enrolling in Northern colleges because of liquidity constraints.  
  If liquidity constraints had played a significant role in hampering the mobility of 
students from the South to the North, we would expect to find that inter-regional mobility is 
much lower for students belonging to less educated and less wealthy households. Surprisingly 
enough, this is not the case. If we replicate Table 2 separately for individuals with 
“advantaged” and “disadvantaged” family background at age 14 – advantaged background 
                                                 
17 With a few exceptions, numerus clausus in Italy is restricted to specific fields – such as Medicine – and to 
newly established faculties.   12
being defined when the father was an entrepreneur, a manager, a high ranked director, a 
teacher or a high ranked white collar, and disadvantaged background when the father was in a 
low paying occupation – there is no difference worth noticing – see Table 3 below. The 
percentage of students in our dataset residing in the South who went to college in the South is 
72.99 percent if from a good family background and 74.12 percent if from a bad background. 
On the other hand, the percentage of students residing in the South before college who moved 
to the North for college is 8.22 among those with good background and 6.94 percent among 
those with bad background. These differences remain small even when we measure 
background with parental education
18.  
 
<Table 3 around here> 
 
An alternative and we believe more plausible explanation of the limited mobility 
flows from the South to the North is that the internal rate of return to going to college does 
not differ significantly across macro-areas. There are three pieces of evidence favouring this 
explanation. First, tuition is higher in the North. Even though fees are not high by 
international standards, Northern colleges have used to a much larger extent than other 
universities in the country the opportunity to raise tuition in the second part of the 1990s 
above the centrally established ceiling (Law 122/94). This and the endogenous selection of 
students to college have implied that average tuition in 1995 was about 50 percent higher in 
Northern than in Southern public universities – 511 € versus 326 € at current prices (see 
Silvestri et al, 1996). Second, both opportunity and living costs – including housing – are 
higher in the North. A recent survey of  living costs in a sample of Italian universities has 
shown that in 2000 the annual cost – inclusive of rent, transportation and food - of going to a 
                                                 
18 Results available from the authors upon request.    13
university located in a different region was 6135 € in Pavia, 5866  € in Venice – both in the 
North, and 4668 € and 5402 € in the Southern cities of Cagliari and Napoli respectively, with 
a North–South gap close to about 30 percent (Catalano and Fiegna, 2003).  
These differences in costs, however, are too small to compensate for the differences in 
expected returns. A third factor at play is that the observed employment weighted college 
wage gaps three years after graduation could be temporary effects, which are washed away 
over time, as individuals settle down in the labour market and in permanent jobs, and 
accumulate labour market experience. Evidence that the effects of college quality on earnings 
and employment probabilities wane over labour market careers is discussed by Warren, 
Hauser and Sheridan (2002) and Brand and Halaby (2003) for the US. Employers use 
credentials, including college quality, as a signal of skills at labour market entry, but as 
individuals age this signal loses importance relative to other sources of information, such as 
direct screening. Support for this explanation comes from the 2002 wave of the Survey on the 
Income and Wealth of Italian Households (SHIW), carried out by the Bank of Italy, which 
includes information on the college of graduation. The sample of graduates is much smaller 
than the one we are using in this paper, but has the advantage of covering individuals of 
different age rather than only labour market entrants. We define a dummy for the young – 
aged from 25 to 34 – and for the adult – aged from 35 to 55, and regress both monthly 
earnings and employment propensities on individual controls, area of residence, faculty 
dummies and age dummies. We also interact both age group dummy with a dummy equal to 
1 if the college of graduation was located in the North and to zero otherwise. Our key results 
are presented in Table 4
19. They show that monthly earnings do not differ in a significant way 
with the area where the college of graduation was located. Employment propensities, 
however, differ, because the young age group from Northern colleges enjoys a significantly 
                                                 
19 These regressions consider only employees, because the self-reported earnings of professionals are 
notoriously unreliable. Notice however that results do not change significantly if professionals are added to the 
sample. The results are available from the authors upon request.   14
higher probability of employment. More importantly for our purposes, however, is the 
finding that this relative advantage disappears among adults. 
 
<Table 4 around here> 
 
Consistent but temporary employment weighted wage gains may not suffice to trigger 
the mobility of students from Southern to Northern universities in a society where the 
establishment and maintenance of informal networks is key to social promotion and to the 
access of good job opportunities
20: moving to a Northern college can generate temporary 
wage gains, but at the more permanent cost of severing and / or failing to improve the 
existing network of local connections.  
While economic considerations certainly play a role in explaining limited student 
mobility, historical, social and cultural factors also matter. For instance, decomposing 
mobility flows by region, rather than by macro-area, reveals that mobility is rather 
heterogeneous across Southern regions, and is much larger in Calabria than in Sicily. This 
fact does not seem to depend on expected earnings differentials. An important additional 
reason is that the largest university in the former region was established fairly recently, in the 
seventies. Before that, students from Calabria had to move elsewhere to study, and moving 
for college education was part of the social custom, contrary to the Sicilian experience, where 
universities where established in the nineteenth century. 
  
4.2. Private and public universities 
Why do earnings and employment probabilities three years after graduation vary 
depending on the attended college? The natural answer is that colleges differ in quality, and 
                                                 
20 See Pistaferri, 1999.   15
that this quality is priced by the labour market. One important dimension of college quality is 
whether the university is public or private. We investigate this dimension by replacing the 
college dummies in the second step regression either with a dummy equal to 1 if the 
university is private and to zero otherwise or with the interactions of this dummy with faculty 
dummies. By using interactions, we allow the effects of the private college dummy to vary 
with the faculty
21. These effects can be identified because there is within-field variation in 
college status – either public or private. Table 5 presents the results separately for earnings, 
employment probabilities (Box Cox transformations) and employment weighted earnings.  
 
<Table 5 around here> 
 
We find that going to a private university has a positive and statistically significant 
effect. Since wage effects are estimated from a first step log earnings equation, we can 
interpret the estimated coefficient attached to the private college dummy as the approximate 
percentage change in earnings associated to graduating from a private college. To ease 
interpretation, coefficients on (Box-Cox) employment effects are complemented by the 
implied effects on employment probabilities, which is the third number in each cell.  
It turns out that going to a private university increases employment weighted earnings 
three years after graduation by close to 18 percent, a significant effect. Behind the average 
effect there is substantial heterogeneity: the graduates of private universities in the fields of 
Law and Economics earn respectively close to 50 and 20 percent more than graduates of 
public colleges in the same fields. On the other hand, the graduates in the Humanities and 
Natural Sciences do not gain significantly from going to a private college.  
                                                 
21 Notice that there are some fields of study – Engineering for example – which are only available in public 
universities. We pool together some fields – Psychology, Foreign Languages and Education with Humanities, 
Agricultural Studies with Natural Sciences – in order to have a sufficient number of observations in the second 
step estimation.   16
  
4.3. College quality 
Is the difference made by private colleges due to observable measures of college 
quality? We capture quality with the (log) pupil – teacher ratio, the classical indicator used in 
the related literature (see Hanushek, 2002), but also control for the (log) number of students 
in the college and faculty. Since selection at entry is rare in Italian universities, and mobility 
is limited, a larger size - conditional on the pupil-teacher ratio - reflects relative demand for 
college education in the area. We include our selected measure of college quality and college 
size in the vector z of equation (2) and present the associated estimates in Table 6. We find 
that the coefficients of the log pupil – teacher ratio and log size attract a negative and positive 
statistically significant sign respectively.  
 
<Table 6 around here> 
 
With both the pupil – teacher ratio and the number of students in logs, the associated 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. Our evidence suggests that a 10 percent 
reduction in the pupil-teacher ratio should increase employment weighted earnings by 2.41 
percent. The  pupil-teacher ratio and the size of private universities in our sample are on 
average 47 and 23 percent lower than in public universities. According to our estimates, these 
combined differences account for a private college wage premium of 7.6 percent. The 
additional premium of 12.6 percent associated to private colleges  needs to be explained by 
considering additional factors.  
A natural candidate is the presence of network effects. Private universities are 
valuable not only because of the higher average quality associated to a lower pupil – teacher 
ratio, but also because they provide access to labour market networks, which are key in the   17
search of good job market opportunities (Pistaferri, 1999).  In a society characterized by 
relatively limited inter-generational mobility – see Checchi et al. (1999)- we expect the 
returns from access to these networks to be complementary with the networks associated to 
privileged parental background.  
To investigate this hypothesis, we classify the family background of college graduates 
in our sample into “disadvantaged” and “advantaged”, depending on the profession of the 
father when the surveyed individual was 14, as we did in the previous subsection. We run 
separate first stage regressions for advantaged and disadvantaged, retrieve the estimated 
college by faculty effects and replicate the second step estimates in Table 6 separately for 
each group. The results are reported in Table 7. 
Going to a private college matters significantly, independently of parental 
background. However, while the gain from going to a private college is driven by the lower 
pupil – teacher ratio for students with a “disadvantaged” background, it is associated to the 
private college dummy for students with an “advantaged” background. We interpret this as 
pointing to complementarity between family and school labour market networks: when 
enrolled students are from a less privileged family background, access to the best networks is 
difficult and the measured quality of the private college, captured by the pupil – teacher ratio, 
makes a difference. When students come from a privileged background, school quality does 
not affect future labour market performance, because all that matters is the additional 
connections afforded by peer interactions in private schools.  
 
<Table 7 around here> 
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5. Conclusion 
Compared to the experience of other developed countries, the system of Italian 
universities has resisted differentiation. This institutional setup suggests that the college an 
individual has graduated from – her Alma Mater – should matter little for labour market 
performance. In this paper, we have used the data from a nationally representative survey of 
Italian graduates to study whether this implication is correct. We have found that Alma Mater 
does matter in the short run, and that college related differences are large both among regions 
– the developed North and the less developed South – and within regions, but not large 
enough to trigger substantial mobility flows from poorly performing to better performing 
institutions, which is driven by medium and long run considerations. Over the longer time 
horizon, the uncovered differences are washed away.  
  We have also found that going to a private university – there are a few such 
institutions in Italy – pays off at least in the early part of a career: the employment weighted 
college wage gains from going to a private college are close to 18 percent. Only part of this 
gain can be explained by the fact that private universities have lower pupil-teacher ratios; at 
least as much depends on other factors, and we speculate that the network effects are 
particularly important in this perspective. Interestingly, school quality in private colleges 
matters more for the less privileged who gain access, and less for the privileged, who can 
combine the informal networks endowed by the family with those provided by the schools.  
  It is an open question whether the gains associated to a private university are large 
enough to compensate the higher tuition costs, and whether they continue as the individual 
progresses in her labour market history. To answer the second question would require that 
graduates be re-interviewed significantly later than 3 years after college, as it happens in 
some countries but not in Italy.  
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Table 1. Mobility flows among the four macro areas of Italy  
  Employment 
North West 
Employment 







93.52 3.47  1.65  1.36 
College North East  12.30  81.87  3.86  1.97 
College Centre  6.95  3.95  75.91  13.18 
College  South  9.17 3.34  6.87 80.62 
Note: the numbers in the table are percentages, which add up to 100 by row.  
 
Table 2. Mobility flows among the four macro areas of Italy, before college and during 
college  
  College 
 North West 
College  





Before College North West  90.78  7.39  1.52  0.30 
Before College  North East  3.79  93.41  2.50  0.31 
Before College  Centre  0.88  4.79  93.69  0.64 
Before College  South  3.56  4.04  18.86  73.54 
Note: the numbers in the table are percentages, which add up to 100 by row.    23
Table 3. Mobility flows among the four macro areas of Italy, before college and during 
college.  
Advantaged background  
  College 
 North West 
College  





Before College North West  91.37  6.77  1.55  0.31 
Before College  North East  4.49  92.50  2.73  0.28 
Before College  Centre  1.15  4.64  93.48  0.73 
Before College  South  3.99  4.23  18.79  72.99 
      
Disadvantaged background 
  College 
 North West 
College  





Before College North West  90.06  8.17  1.49  0.29 
Before College  North East  2.97  94.46  2.24  0.33 
Before College  Centre  0.53  4.99  93.45  0.53 
Before College  South  3.10  3.84  18.94  74.12 
      
 
 
Table 4. Monthly wages and employment probabilities , by age group and region where the 
college is located. Weighted least squares 
  Monthly wages  Employment 
probabilities 
Young * College North  .129 (.117)  .751** (.312) 
Adult  .339*** (.091)  1.475*** (.214) 
Adult * College North  .044 (.082)  .430 (.351) 
Nobs 518  870 
Note: Source: Survey on Households Income and Wealth 2002, Bank of Italy. Each 
regression includes gender, region of residence and faculty dummies. The wage regression 
also includes a part-time dummy. The young age group in the Centre and South in the 
baseline. One, two and three stars for coefficients statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level of confidence. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
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.069    
 .190*** 
(.049) 
Law   .173*** 
(.040) 
 .650*** 
(.220)   
.072    
 .540*** 
(.078) 




.023      

















.076           
 .230 
(.123) 
Nobs  362 362 341  341  341  341 
R  Squared  .499 .502 .398  .403  .381  .387 
Note : each regression includes faculty dummies. One, two and three stars for statistically 
significant parameters at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence.    25
Table 6. The effects of private college dummies on employment weighted earnings 
    












Nobs 279  279 
R squared  .312  .443 
Note: see Table 5. The reduction in the number of observations compared to Table 5 is due to 






























Nobs 257  257    257 
R squared  .325  .326    .401 
Note: see Table 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 